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ABSTRACT
Authorization infrastructures are an important and integral part of grid 
computing which facilitate access control functions to protect resources. 
This paper presents an authorization framework that combines the usage 
control (UCON) model with semantic web technology. To our knowledge, 
an authorization framework that combines both the UCON and semantic web 
technology in one framework has not yet been previously proposed. As the 
UCON model combines traditional access control, trust management and digital 
rights management in a grid authorization infrastructure, its adoption enhances 
the capability of the authorization. However, UCON-based authorization 
presents a problem in controlling the policy granularity and minimizing the 
authorization overhead due to complexity in the policies inherited from the 
UCON model. The growing number of users and resources in the grid makes 
this problem even worse. We use the semantic web technology to provide 
a way to automatically manage the rules in the policies, hence keeping the 
granularity under control. To minimize the authorization overhead, a new 
mechanism to reduce the number of policy checks is proposed in this paper. 
Our simulation result shows that the proposed mechanism provides a 63% 
reduction in rule checking compared to previous methods.
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INTRODUCTION
Grid computing is concerned with geographically distributed computers 
composed of heterogeneous resources that are owned, shared and coordinated 
by multiple administrative domains to provide nontrivial quality of services 
(Foster & Kesselman, 2004). The virtual organization (VO) concept makes 
the resource sharing in a grid possible.  A VO is a group of individuals and 
associated resources and services located within multiple administrative 
domains, but united by a common purpose (Welch, Siebenlist, Foster, 
Bresnahan, Cjajkowski, Gawor et al., 2003). The massiveness, dynamism and 
heterogeneous nature of the grid demand a fine-grained, high performance 
and scalable authorization system. Authorization can be defined as the 
act of providing and checking the authority of a user or a job to access a 
specific set of resources (Cakrabarti, 2007). The requirement for fine-grained 
authorization and high performance makes grid authorization a major 
challenge. Fine-grained authorization is composed of two factors. First, the 
selected authorization model must support as many parameters as possible in 
order to satisfy the need to describe the dynamic and heterogeneous rules in 
grid authorization. Second, the language used to write the security policy must 
be as high-level and expressible as possible so that it can describe the rules 
specifically and accurately as demanded by the grid stakeholders, the grid’s 
users and the resources’ behaviors.
The use of UCON in grid authorization systems provides a good solution for 
describing the dynamic and heterogeneous in the grid authorization (Zhang, 
Parisi, Sandhu, & Park, 2005). The mutability of the users’ and resources’ 
attributes and the continuity of the access monitoring in the UCON model 
provide a fine-grained authorization for the grid. However, UCON-based grid 
authorization presents a problem in controlling the granularity of grid resources’ 
security policies. In order to provide dynamic and continuous monitoring, 
many parameters must be used to describe the users and resources in the grid 
authorization; thus, a very high level of data granularity is required. The large 
number of users and resources in a grid makes it impossible for humans to 
control the granularity of grid security policies manually. A growing number 
of users and resources adds to the risk that the grid authorization system’s 
granularity will burst out of control. Thus, the implementation of UCON in the 
grid authorization system requires a mechanism to keep the granularity under 
control. This paper attempts to solve the granularity control problem using 
ontology and semantic web technology. A new grid authorization framework 
that stores the UCON-based grid security policies in the form of ontology is 
presented. In the framework, the ontology web language (OWL 2) (W3C, 
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Boley, Tabet, Grosof & Dean, 2004) is used to perform the authorization query 
and access the request processing. The advantages of using a combination of 
OWL and SWRL compared to other technologies are that they allow automated 
reasoning and at the same time can perform formal validation and verification 
of the domain constraints specified in the ontology to ensure these constraints 
are fulfilled (Pérez, Bernabe, Calero, Clemete, Perez & Gomez, 2011). To 
minimize the authorization overhead caused by the complex rule checking in 
the policies inherited from the UCON model, a new irrelevant rule elimination 
procedure based on the dependence rules model is used in the framework
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the invention of grids, intensive research has been done to improve the 
grid authorization system in terms of the level of the grain, the scalability 
and the performance of the access control because the native access control 
provided by the Grid Security Infrastructure, namely, the grid map file (Foster 
et al., 1998), is based on the access control list concept that is very coarse-
grained and not scalable. 
The Virtual Organization Membership Service (Alfieri, Cecchini, Ciaschini & 
Agnello, 2005), Akenti (Thompson, Essiari, & Mudumbai, 2003), PERMIS 
(Chadwick & Otenko, 2003) and Community Authorization Service 
(Pearlman,Welch, Foster, Kesselman, & Tuecke, 2002) focus on improving 
authorization functionalities based on the traditional access control concept 
through methods such as discrete access control, mandatory access control and 
role-based access control. However, these approaches have limitations in coping 
with the mutability of users’ and resources’ attributes and continuous access 
monitoring for pervasive environments like a grid computing environment.
The UCON model is an enhancement of the traditional access control models 
which not only deals with authorizations as the basis of its decision-making 
process, but also counts obligations and conditions in the process. In addition, 
the UCON features of continuous access monitoring and mutability of attributes 
provide richer and more dynamic decision-making capabilities than traditional 
access control. The UCON flexibility and finer decision capabilities make it 
very suitable to use in pervasive computing environments like the grid where 
the user and resource pools are very large and dynamic.
A number of studies have adopted the UCON model in a grid computing 
environment. There are three types of grid, namely, data grids, service grids, 
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data grids, the UCON model has been adapted for the case of distributed 
systems with multiple authoritative points (Stagni, 2009). That study proposed 
a theoretical methodology (i.e. the goal-oriented approach) to formally 
validate the UCON policy enforcement. A formal model for the architecture 
and prototype implementation of UCON in grid computational services was 
proposed by Martinelli and Mori (2010). In their model, the policy language 
based on process algebra (POLPA) is used to specify security policy. Using the 
POLPA, continuous policy control and other UCON peculiarities such as the 
mutability of users’ and objects’ attributes, and inclusion of obligations and 
conditions as well as authorization in the access decision process, are able to be 
provided. A usage-based authorization framework for collaborative computing 
was proposed by Zhang, Nakae, Covington, &  Sandhu (2008). They used 
extensible access control markup language to specify UCON policy in their 
prototype. In their framework, a sensor program is used to detect changes in 
users’ attributes in the user platform. All of these UCON-based authorization 
solutions assume a small number of users and resources so that the granularity 
of the security policy can be updated and maintained manually by the security 
officers in an organization. They lack the semantic-aware component element 
that can assist in controlling the granularity of the security policy for the large-
scale scenario. The numbers of users and resources in a grid keep on increasing 
year by year. For example, the Enabling Grid for E-Science project holds about 
17,000 identities of users, the management of which required around 336,000 
policy statements in 2011 (Pérez et al., 2011). It is impossible to manually 
control the granularity of data for such large numbers of users. Therefore, we 
propose a framework that uses ontology to store the UCON-based security 
policies and process the evaluation of authorization using a combination of 
OWL 2 and SWRL.
Apart from the need for richer features to accommodate authorization policy 
specification and autonomous management, grid computing also needs a high 
performance authorization system, especially as grids become larger and larger 
in the future. The performance testing results of previous grid authorization 
systems show that the authorization request time exponentially increases when 
the number of individuals in a VO increases (Martinelli & Mori, 2010; Pérez et 
al., 2011). The number of individuals refers to the number of grid users in a VO. 
These results indicate that the performance of the grid authorization system 
will exponentially decrease when the number of users of the grid increases. 
The impact of this overhead will be greater in a large-scale grid environment 
because the large-scale grid environment involves more subjects, objects and 
operations compared to an ordinary grid environment. The use of the UCON 
as a policy model adds complexity to the policy representation. The number 
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very high, making the process of authorizing a user more time-consuming 
and reducing the overall grid authorization performance. Thus, there is a need 
to find a new method to minimize the effect of increasing numbers, size and 
complexity of security policies on the grid authorization performance.
Modeling Resource and Security Policy in the Grid VO
Let us consider a grid VO that deploys j resources in its environment. There 
will be j resources that can be requested by a subject (s):
Definition 1
R = {r1, r2, r3,…,rj}, j = 1, …, k where R is the set of grid resources in a VO.
For each resource rj ∈Ο there will be a corresponding security policy SPj⊆SR 
where SR is defined as:
Definition 2 
  
SR = {sr1, sr2, sr, ..,srk}, k = 1, …,l where SR is the set of security rules for the VO.
A user who wants to access resource rj needs to satisfy all the security rules 
of SPj. Most of the existing grid authorization systems adopt an inefficient 
structure for storing security policies for the available resources. Many systems 
use the brute force approach (BFA) during the authorization process which 
consumes a very high authorization overhead due to redundancy and repetition 
in the security policy checking (Hoheisel & Mueller, 2006). Due to that reason, 
in most cases, the grid VO only deploys a very simple policy whereby if a 
user’s identity is verified during the authentication process, then the user is 
allowed to access all the resources in the grid. The BFA is modeled by the rule 
mapping (RM) group as expressed in the following definition:
Definition 3
RM = {(rj, SPj)} | rj ∈Ο , srj⊆SR where j = 1,…,k
In a grid VO every resource has its own security policy which contains rules 
that might be similar or almost similar to some other resource’s security policy. 
For example, if a grid VO consists of j resources deployed by j numbers of 
security policy, SPj, that consist of k security rules, similarity of rules in the 
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SP1= {sr1, sr2}, SP2= {sr1, sr2}, SP3 = {sr1, sr2, sr3} and SPj = {sr1, sr2, srk}
The RM of BFA for this scenario gives: 
RMBFA = {(r1, {sr1, sr2}), (r2,{sr1, sr2}), (r3,{sr1, sr2, sr3}),…, (rj,{sr1, sr2, srk}) 
The process of checking the security rules using the BFA for this scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 1 which gives a sequential complexity of O(k*j); where k 
is the maximum number of rules in each security policy and j is the number of 





























  Figure 1. Brute force approach mechanism for rule checking.
Efforts have been made to improve the brute force mechanism, such as the 
primitive clustering mechanism (PCM) (Kaiiali et al., 2008), hierarchical 
clustering mechanism (HCM) (Kaiiali et al., 2010) and grid authorization graph 
(GAG) (Kaiiali, Wankar, Rao, Agarwal, & Buyya, 2013). These mechanisms 
aim to reduce the redundancy and repetition in security policy checking. 
The Primitive Clustering Method 
PCM reduces the redundancy of checking using a clustering method that 
depends on the similarity of the security policy. It is modeled using a rule 
mapping group called reverse rules mapping (RRM):
Definition 4
Let rj⊆R = {ri|ri ∈R, (ri, SPj) ∈RM} be the set of all resources that share the 
same security policy SPj. Then,
RRM ={(SPj, Rj) | SPj⊆SR} is the set of security policies relevant to a group 
of resource assignments.
Using the same example as above and j=3 yields:
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Rather than doing four rounds of checking, PCM only does two rounds of 
checking for the same scenario. The illustration of PCM for this scenario is 



















  Figure 2. Primitive clustering mechanism for rule checking.
Primitive clustering removes the redundancy of checking the identical security 
policies, but the redundancy of checking identical security rules still exists. 
This limitation is overcome in the HCM. 
Hierarchical Clustering Mechanism 
HCM further reduces the redundancy in checking the security rules by arranging 
the resources’ security policy using a hierarchical tree structure. The HCM 
building algorithm was developed based on the depth-first search algorithm 
using the data in the security table (ST).  
The ST is a simple table that represents the RM group of rule-checking 
mechanisms. In ST, the security rules are considered as attributes and the 
resources are considered as objects. The ST entry is a Boolean value of 1 or 0. 
If the l-th security rules are elements of the j-th resource, the entry of the (j,l)th 
cell of the ST is 1 and vice versa. 
Grid Authorization Graph 
One limitation of the HCM is that it cannot describe the OR-based security 
policies. The GAG enhances the HCM by overcoming this limitation. By 
introducing special types of edges, namely, the correspondence edge and the 
discrepancy edge, the GAG can totally eliminate the redundancy of checking 
and can handle the cases where the sets of security rules are mutually exclusive.
In every security policy there may be rules that depend on other rules whereby, if 
the rules are treated independently, they become irrelevant to the authorization 
context and increase the total set of rules that must be checked. As the grid size 
grows and the number of security policies increases, the number of irrelevant 
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In the proposed UCON and semantic-based authorization framework we 
introduce policy filters as components in the framework. The policy filters are 
responsible for reducing the number of rules checked during the authorization 
process. This results in a reduction in the time taken to authorize grid users in 
very large-scale grid computing.
METHODOLOGY
The UCON and semantic-based authorization framework is developed using 
the policy enforcement implementation (PEI) method (Sandhu, 2006). We 
follow the method used by Zhang et al. (2008) in developing our framework. 
The early literature (Park, 2003) assumed the policy layer would be rigorous 
and well defined; however, in reality, the highest level policy is very informal 
and fuzzy. Modern systems like grids are distributed and have multiple 
trust and service dependencies, thus it is very hard to close the gap between 
policy and mechanism in such a complex environment. The PEI framework 
introduces a realistic approach through which it can accommodate an informal 
policy layer at the top and hence close the overall gap between informal policy 
and concrete code in multiple steps. Figure 3 illustrates the PEI framework. 
Figure 3. Policy enforcement implementation framework.
The top layer of the PEI framework defines the security and system goals. In 
this layer, we define the security and system requirements informally. This 
layer is necessarily informal. It is a mistake to try to formalize this layer as 
in the traditional security system design approach. The purpose of the second 
Security and System Goals  
(objectives/Policy)
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layer is to take informal high-level objectives and flesh out rigor and detail 
using formal or quasi-formal notation. In this stage, the subjects, objects, 
administrator roles, groups and other requirements are specified in an ideal 
setting. In this layer, we use the UCON policy model (Zhang et al., 2005) as 
our model.
The enforcement and implementation layer address how the desired policy 
model can be enforced in the chosen environment. It addresses the big picture 
of the “how” question, at the level of the system block diagram and protocol 
flow. The protocol flow can be formalized and analyzed in order to establish 
the various security properties of the system. However, certain levels of detail 
are left unspecified, and these are elaborated on in the implementation model. 
At this layer, the approximated policy is realized using the system architecture 
(with trusted servers, clients etc.). In the implementation model, we focus 
on the specific issues identified in the enforcement model. These issues are 
focused on in detail up to the pseudo-code level of detail precision.
The adjacent layers have many-to-many relationships with each other. For 
example, a single policy model can be enforced by a multiple enforcement 
model. However, there are certain different trade-offs between security, trust, 
performance, cost, convenience and other factors. On the other hand, a single 
enforcement model may be supported by the multiple policy model. The 
relationship between the enforcement model and the implementation model is 
similar. At the layer of the implementation model, a specific issue identified in 
the previous layer will be resolved in sufficient detail.
THE UCON AND SEMANTIC-BASED AUTHORIZATION 
FRAMEWORK
The UCON and semantic-based authorization framework consists of three 
different levels, as illustrated in Figure 4. Each level caters for different grid 
authorization requirements.
Level 1: Multi-Domain Grid Infrastructure
Level 1 of the framework caters for the authorization process with a combination 
of multi-organizational grid infrastructures to form a federated grid. In the grid, 
each of the different resources may be contributed by different organizations. 
Each resource in an organization may have its own security policy. At this 
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proposed by Ibrahim, Hamdan, Ibrahim, Abdullah & Latip (2012). This level 
also caters for the multiple authorities’ security points (Lorch, Cowles, Baker, 
Gommans, Madsen, McNab et al., 2004), as depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 4. UCON and semantic grid authorization framework.
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The security policy of each resource in the grid is input and updated by a policy 
officer. Each policy officer is a Source of Authority (SoA) for an authoritative 
point in the grid. The site or resource policy officer defines and updates the 
rules related to the resources’ policies and resources’ attributes. The VO policy 
officer inputs and updates the rules in the security policy related to the VO 
policy and users’ attributes. The grid stakeholders define and update the rules 
regarding the stakeholder policy. All the rules are combined to represent the 
security policies required by that particular grid in the form of an ontology. 
Figure 6 illustrates the first three class levels of the security policy ontology 
based on the UCON attributes.
Figure 6. First three class levels of the UCON-based security policy ontology.
The ontology is designed in such a way that it can store rules to provide the 
UCON peculiarities during the user request evaluation process. In UCON, 
the existence of a right for a user does not depend on authorizations only: 
obligations and conditions are also considered. This ontology also supports 
the UCON feature of ongoing monitoring of the user’s request. The ontology 
is designed so that, for each user request, the authorization, obligations and 
conditions are checked before, during and after the usage of the resources. 
This makes the authorization very dynamic and enables it to be continuously 
monitored tailored to the UCON peculiarities. The policy filter is used to reduce 
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of irrelevant rules is used in order to reduce the number of checks. To determine 
the irrelevant rules, the rules are modeled based on their dependencies on other 
rules. The example of the proposed rules dependency model is shown in Figure 
7 which is based on European Grid Initiative (EGI) grid environment security 
policies analysis. Yuhanis, Madi, & Hassan (2012) simulate a dependency 
model for the same grid environment by calculating dependency level using 
file weight. We used a different approach. Our dependency model is based 
on hierarchical tree. A detailed explanation of our method was published in 
Ibrahim et al. (2014).
Level 2: Distributed Databases
Level 2 of the framework consists of components to cater for the requirements 
of the distributed authorization databases that store the federated grid’s security 
policies. Each grid infrastructure owns a database that models the rules concept 
and domain concept of that particular grid. In order to model the grid domain 
concept, we enhance the existing core grid ontology (Xing et al., 2006) on the 
policy model to make it suitable for modeling the UCON policy model.
Figure 7. Rules dependency model.
The core grid ontology is suitable because it more closely models the grid 
environment used in Malaysia (i.e. based on the European grid) compared to 
the common information model (Bumpu, Sweitzer, Thompson, Westerine, 
& Williams, 2000) and the standard ontology for ubiquitous and pervasive 
applications (Chen, Perich, Finin, & Joshi, 2004). The architecture used to 
embed this framework in each resource is shown in Figure 8. The modified 
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Figure 8. UCON and semantic implementation architecture.
Level 3: Federated Authorization Application Service
The federated authorization application service serves the function of 
interacting with the user. It collects the attributes of the user that requests the 
grid services and sends the attributes to the policy decision point (PDP) via the 
grid information system as shown in Figure 8. The PDP then interacts with the 
semantic usage-based organization ontology and policy repository that stores 
the authorization rules for all the resources in the federated grid to obtain the 
answer regarding the user’s privileges.
The PDP then pushes the privilege to the policy enforcement point (PEP) to 
enforce the decision to all the worker nodes and storage elements involved 
in the federated grid. The resource provider attributes management (RPAM) 
interacts with the grid information system to collect the resource attributes and 
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Figure 9. Modified part of the core grid ontology (Xing et al., 2006).
EVALUATION
A quantitative evaluation was performed by simulating the rule checking 
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(Kaiiali et al., 2013). All the experiments were done by enhancing the grid 
authorization simulator (GAS) developed by Kaiiali et al. (2013). The GAS 
was run on a Windows 7 machine with Intel Core i7 CPU at 2.10 GHz with 
12 GB of RAM. First, we validated our simulator by initiating 100 different 
authorization processes with the input of randomly generated authorization 
rules. After that, we ran our simulator using 100 initiated authorizations 
for a grid consisting of 200 resources and 15 security rules. Then, a graph 
comparing GAG with our method was plotted. The X axis (“Experiment 
No.”) was for the number of initiating authorization processes, and the Y axis 
(“Number of Checked Security Rules”) was for the authorization complexity. 
Figure 10 is a graph of the complexity checking for 100 initiated authorization 
processes for 12 resources with four authorization rules, while Figure 11 is a 
graph of the complexity checking for 100 initiated authorization processes for 
200 resources with 15 authorization rules. The dotted line represents the GAG 
and the non-dotted line represents the proposed method.
Figure 10. Complexity of rule checking for 100 initiated authorization 
processes for a grid consisting of 12 resources and four authorization rules 
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Figure 11. Complexity of rule checking for 100 initiated authorization 
processes for a grid consisting of 200 resources and 15 security rules using 
the GAG and proposed method.
DISCUSSION
From the results presented above in Figure 10, we can realize that the maximum 
number of checking authorization rules for the GAG is equal to the number of 
authorization rules existing in the system. This result is in agreement with the 
result obtained by Kaiiali et al. (2013). It proves that our simulation result is 
correct. It is noted that the average minimum number of rule checks for the 
GAG was equal to 2, compared to 0 for our method. This is true because while 
the GAG checked all the possible authorization policies, the checking process is 
sometimes skipped in our method due to the irrelevance of the rules. The results 
presented above in Figure 11 showed that there was a significant reduction in 
the number of checks using our method in a larger grid environment. It is 
noted that a large grid environment consists of a large number of resources and 
rules including a large number of irrelevant rule sets. The elimination of those 
sets has a significant impact on reducing complexity checking in the larger grid 
environment.
To further compare the result between our method and the GAG, the percentage 
of the total reduction of rule checking was calculated based on the average 
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Table 1
Percentage Comparison of the Average Number of Security Rule Checks for 
100 Initiated Authorization Processes for a Grid Consisting of 200 Resources 
and 15 Security Rules
Method Average number 







Total reductions = 63%
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
To briefly summarize, we have proposed a new solution for facilitating 
federated grid authorization. This solution enhances the previous approaches 
by combining UCON features and semantic technology in order to improve the 
methods of controlling the granularity of the security policy to support the grid 
authorization requirements for a large grid environment. In the framework, we 
create the policy filter that uses a new mechanism to reduce the complexity of 
the access control policy. From the results of our simulation, our mechanism is 
shown to gain a 63% reduction on complexity checking compared to the GAG. 
We believe this work contributes to the enhanced performance of federated grid 
authorization systems. For future work, we plan to adopt the idea and method 
used in Yuhanis et al. (2012) which calculate file dependency using file weight 
parameter and evaluate this framework based on the that performance metric. 
We also plan to prove the feasibility of this concept by implementing this 
framework in a real grid test bed for more advanced and accurate evaluation.
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